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The Insanity Defense in 
Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings 
MAXINE M. HARRINGTON, ESQ.· and 
ANN O'REGAN KEARY, ESQ." 
The insanity defense in delinquency proceedings poses an important 
legal dilemma concerning the rights of children in the juvenile justice 
system. Indeed, beyond the purely legal concerns of the rights of an 
accused juvenile, the concept of criminal responsibility in the context 
of juvenile court proceedings raises perhaps an even more important 
issue of what is the best model for dealing with mentally ill juvenile 
offenders, both from the juvenile's viewpoint and that of society as a 
whole. It is our opinion that not only does the insanity defense have an 
appropriate role in juvenile proceedings, but that legal as well as 
practical considerations dictate that juveniles be permitted to raise the 
defense. Denial of this defense to juveniles poses serious negative 
ramifications for our system of justice and the individual accused child. 
Between 1966 and 1975, the U.S. Supreme Court broke new ground 
in extending certain constitutional rights to children in juvenile 
delinquency proceedings. Previously, such children, although charged 
with criminal offenses, had been afforded significantly fewer procedural 
rights than adults who were charged with the same offenses. Although 
during the 1960's, the federal courts and, in particular, the Supreme 
Court, had provided many legal protections and safeguards for the 
rights of adult criminal defendants, such protections had never been 
extended to accused juveniles. Rather, juveniles were treated within the 
framework of a system whose goals were rehabilitation and treatment, 
as deemed to be in the best interests of the particular child. The 
informal, non-adversary nature of juvenile proceedings, which were 
labeled "civil" rather than "criminal," had been considered beneficial to 
the juvenile and consistent with the rehabilitative purpose of the 
juvenile justice system. However, as the Supreme Court recognized in 
its 1967 landmark opinion, In re Gault,l important constitutional rights 
of children had, in fact, been sacrificed in exchange for the theoretically 
beneficial treatment of the civil-style proceedings. 
In a series of cases dealing with the juvenile court system, the 
Supreme Court has generally held that juveniles charged with criminal 
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offenses must be afforded due process safeguards similar to those which 
the Court had guaranteed to adult criminal defendants. First, in Kent v. 
U.S.,2 the court stated that procedures accorded to juveniles must 
measure up to the constitutional essentials of due process and fair 
treatment, and that counsel must be provided to the child for 
representation at the critical hearing on the issue of whether the child 
would be tried in a juvenile or adult proceeding. In the following year, 
haVing paved the way inKent, the Court rendered its seminal decision, In 
re Gault, which granted accused children many of the minimal due 
process rights afforded to adult criminal defendants at trial, including 
notice of charges, right to counsel, right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses and the privilege against self-incrimination. The Gault opinion, 
which has formed the basis of all subsequent children's rights litigation 
and case law, eschewed the long-accepted "civil" label which had 
attached to juvenile proceedings. The Court's decision clearly recognized 
that "unbridled discretion (of theJuvenile Court), however benevolently 
motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure,"3 
where the end result may be a child's indefinite confinement in an 
institution. 
In 1970, the Supreme Court in the case of In re Winship4 expanded the 
list of constitutional safeguards available to juveniles when it applied 
the adult criminal standard of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, to 
delinquenc1proceedings. Thus, juveniles who previously could have 
been adjudicated delinquent and suffered a resulting loss of liberty 
merely on the basis of proof by a preponderance of evidence (the civil 
standard of proof), were now entitled to a judgment in their favor unless 
the prosecution was able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
juvenile had committed the offense charged. 
In 1971, the Court temporarily halted the extension of adult procedural 
safeguards to juvenile proceedings by declining to rule that juveniles 
were entitled to a trial by jury. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,5 the Court 
reiterated the need for accused children to have the essentials of due 
process and fair treatment in the fact-finding process, yet ruled that trial 
by jury was not a concomitant necessity of accurate fact-finding. The 
Court's deciSion, which distinguished a trial by jury from the other 
safeguards it had considered more integral to accurate fact-finding, 
turned in part on the Court's concern that jury trials would alter the 
informal and confidential atmosphere of juvenile proceedings, a feature 
the Court still deemed beneficial to the children involved. 
The last decision in this series of opinions was rendered in 1975 and 
involved the application of the double jeopardy principle to juvenile 
proceedings. The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees 
that no person shall twice be put in jeopardy of life or limb for the same 
offense. However, since juvenile proceedings had traditionally been 
considered civil, as opposed to criminal, proceedings, the defense of 
double jeopardy had not previously been afforded to children. In Breed v. 
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Jones,6 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its position in Gault that juvenile 
proceedings were, in fact, criminal in nature, since their "object is to 
determine whether he (the child) has committed acts that violate 
criminal law and whose potential consequences include both the stigma 
inherent in such a determination and the deprivation of liberty for many 
years."7 The Court, therefore, extended the protection of the Constitu-
tional double jeopardy clause to juvenile delinquency proceedings. 
Despite this flurry oflegal developments in the area of juvenile rights, 
the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of the role of the concept 
of criminal responsibility in such proceedings and whether an accused 
child-has a right to raise a defense of insanity. The insanity defense, and 
the basic concept of conditioning responsibility for one's criminal act 
on the capacity to understand the nature of that act and to exercise free 
will in acting have traditionally and historically played a significant part 
in our criminal justice system. In 1895, the Supreme Court established 
the rule in federal courts that "an accused is entitled to acquittal of the 
specific crime charged if, upon all the evidence, there is reasonable 
doubt whether he was capable in law of committing the crime."8 Today, 
all 50 states plus the federal government guarantee an adult accused the 
right to assert the defense of insanity in criminal proceedings. If found 
legally insane, an accused is thus excused from criminal responsibility 
and its attendant punishment (usually with court-ordered psychiatric 
treatment as an alternative disposition). 
The issue of criminal responsibility, however, has not figured 
prominently in the juvenile justice system for the simple reason that 
juvenile proceedings were traditionally considered non-criminal. The 
focus in juvenile delinquency proceedings rested less on the issue of 
culpability for the offense committed than on the rehabilitative needs 
of the involved juvenile. Although the Supreme Court has not specifically 
confronted the applicability of the insanity defense to juvenile pro-
ceedings, its rulings as to other rights attendant to juvenile proceedings 
have laid the cornerstone upon which some state courts have ruled in 
favor of permitting the insanity defense to be raised in a juvenile case. 
One of the first nationally reported cases on this issue, In re Winburn, 9 
was decided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in 1966. The Wisconsin 
Court relied heavily upon the Supreme Court's decision in Kent, 
guaranteeing due process and fair treatment to juveniles. In Winburn, 
this issue of first impression arose from an insanity defense raised by a 
15-year-old boy charged with the fatal shooting of his mother. The 
Court noted, Significantly, that although the philosophy behind the 
Wisconsin juvenile act was rehabilitation and treatment, such enforced 
treatment may be deemed punishment of the juvenile involved and 
that, in practice, retribution did in fact playa role in the juvenile court's 
function. 10 In view of this factor as well as the stigma attached to 
adjudication as a juvenile delinquent, the Court concluded that the 
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concept of criminal responsibility was relevant to juvenile proceedings. 
Moreover, the Court determined that the insanity defense should be 
made available, to juveniles as well as adults, as a fundamental right 
inherent in the fair treatment prescribed by the Supreme Court, in 
order to guard against unjust imposition of punishment upon a 
mentally impaired wrongdoer. 
Similarly, later cases in California,ll Nevada,12 New Jersey,13 and 
Louisiana,14 ruled favorably on the issue of the applicability of the 
insanity defense to juvenile proceedings. These State Court opinions, 
the majority of which were rendered in the late 1970's, rested 
predominantly on an interpretation of the Supreme Court's opinions in 
Kent and Gault as establishing the right of a juvenile to avail himself of 
this defense as well as other safeguards which played an integral and 
legaU y necessary role in ad ult proceedings. Indeed, in State of Louisiana in 
the Interest of Pate Causey15 the Supreme Court of Louisiana noted that the 
denial of the right to plead insanity would be violative of an adult 
criminal defendant's rights to due process and fundamental fairness 
under its state and federal constitutions. The Court concluded that the 
juvenile should, therefore, be similarly granted this right since the 
function of the insanity defense was essential to fair treatment. 
In light of the fairly uniform approach of the state courts addreSSing 
this issue, a recent case from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
is of major 1nterest and significance. In late 1979, the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals rejected the right to interpose an insanity 
defense in juvenile proceedings in the case of In re C. W.M. 16 The Court 
noted that the function of the insanity defense in adult proceedings "is 
not to establish the innocence of the accused but to absolve him of the 
moral and penal consequences of his criminal act. "17 Concluding that an 
adjudication of delinquency is not a determination of "criminal" 
responsibility which results in the impOSition of a penal sanction, the 
Court held that in view of the overall rehabilitative purpose of the 
juvenile system, the insanity defense would be "superfluous" in a 
delinquency proceeding.18 In reaching this finding, the Court observed 
that the District of Columbia's practice of considering the juvenile's 
mental condition at the time of disposition, which is analogous to 
Sentencing, was adequate to ensure that a child who was mentally ill at 
the time of the offense or the time of the disposition hearing would 
receive psychiatric care and treatment similar to that provided mentally 
ill adult defendants. In re C. W.M. thus turns back the clock to pre-Gault 
days when the traditional advocates of the juvenile system held 
tenaciously to the unrealistic dream that dispositions of juveniles 
adjudicated delinquent resulted in beneficial treatment and rehabilitation 
of a clinical rather than a punitive nature. 
In re C. W.M. essentially ignores Supreme Court precedent, first 
established in Gault, which recognizes that there is a gap between the 
original benign beginnings of the juvenile system and its present 
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realities. Gault and its progeny had consistently rejected the notion that 
an adjudication of delinquency is either" non-criminal" or not geared to 
"punish" the child. In re C. W.M. also fails to address adequately the 
essential question: does a juvenile have a right not to be adjudicated 
culpable for an offense committed while he was unable to appreciate or 
understand the nature of his act. Legally, the issue turns on whether the 
insanity defense is an essential component of due process and fair 
treatment. 20 It can be persuasively argued that the insanity defense is a 
fundamental right of due process for adults: the insanity defense has 
long been present in English and American jurisprudence, and all 51 
jurisdictions presently recognize its vital role in the administration of 
criminal justice. Several states' courts have expressly held that denial of 
the right to plead insanity violates the fundamental concept of fairness 
embodied in due process safeguards.21 From this one can conclude that 
the insanity defense is fundamental to juvenile delinquency proceedings.22 
Perhaps the more important facet of this issue, however, is not 
whether the right to plead insanity is legally required as a constitutional 
right of all juveniles, but whether it is desirable from either the 
juvenile's or society's perspective. 
The early juvenile court reformers' dream of solicitude and protection 
of juvenile offenders from the harsh consequences of the punitive and 
retributive criminal system has regrettably been largely unrealized. It is 
today widely recognized that an adjudication of delinquency is far from 
harmless and, in fact, may portend grave consequences for the involved 
child particularly if he is emotionally disturbed. Many jurisdictions 
permit "indefinite" commitment of an adjudicated delinquent to an 
institution.23 In some instances a juvenile can be confined longer than 
his adult counterpart for violation of the same law.24 Some jurisdictions, 
moreover, allow juveniles to be incarcerated with adults if certain 
conditions are met. 2~ Thus, a juvenile can theoretically be placed in an 
adult correctional system without having been extended the full 
protections of an adult trial, including the right to plead insanity. 
There has also been abundant criticism of the "rehabilitative" efforts 
of juvenile institutions. In Gault, the Supreme Court was alarmed by the 
high recidivist rate of juvenile offenders and concluded that this fact at 
least "casts some doubt about the adequacy of treatment afforded 
juveniles."26 One study has found that few institutions for juveniles 
were providing adequate psychiatric screening or services for emotionally 
disturbed youths, and many were failing to meet accepted standards 
regarding medical supervision and control. 27 It is not surprising, 
therefore, that in recent years, the Courts have witnessed the rise of 
juvenile "right to treatment" cases. In one such case, Nelson v. Heyne, 28 
decided in 1974, a federal appellate court found that staff of a medium 
security "boys school" were inflicting corporal punishment upon the 
children (beatings with a wooden paddle) as well as indiscriminately 
administering tranquilizing drugs in violation of the children's 
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constitutional rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The 
Court observed that the school failed to provide even the minimal 
rehabilitative treatment to which the confined youths were constitu-
tionally entitled. 
Apart from the moral and legal issues inherent in inflicting punishment 
on an individual whose illness may negate his responsibility, there are 
other serious ramifications of a delinquency adjudication. The child is 
labeled a "delinquent." Although a juvenile adjudicated delinquent may 
not suffer the same civil disabilities as an adult convicted of criminal 
acts, the Supreme Court in Gault recognized that in recent years "this 
term (delinquent) has come to involve only slightly less stigma than the 
term 'criminal' applied to adults."29 In addition, although juvenile 
records are ostensibly confidential, court and police records are routinely 
disclosed to government agencies, prosecutors and law enforcement 
agencies. 30 Thus, an adjudication of delinquency, much like a criminal 
conviction, is a label that in future years may continue to be a handicap 
to a child. 
Other factors also militate in favor of a right to assert the defense of 
insanity in juvenile proceedings. The entire concept of criminal 
responsibility is based on relieving an individual who cannot understand 
the nature of his act from its penal consequences. 31 Sanity and culpability 
are closely interrelated in our legal system. Society benefits little from 
punishing l child for acts which he did not intend to do, or the 
wrongfulness of which he could not appreciate. An adjudication of 
delinquency will not impress upon an insane child the significance of his 
offense, nor will it necessarily deter him or others from committing 
future criminal acts. Thus, denying the child the right to plead insanity 
is pointless from a utilitarian point of view, as well as unjust from a 
purely legal perspective. 
It is also important to note that the availability of other defenses to 
criminal responsibility which may be raised by adults are equally 
applicable to juvenile proceedings, e.g., accident or self-defense. It is at 
once apparent that if the juvenile court system will make distinctions 
between an accidental violation of the law and an intentional one, it 
should also distinguish acts committed by a child who is legally insane 
from those committed by one who understands the full consequences of 
his acts. 32 
If the insanity defense is not allowed in juvenile cases, the only 
alternative is for a court to consider the child's mental condition after he 
is adjudicated delinquent at the time of the dispositional hearing. This 
alternative was approved by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
in In re C. W.M. as the method to ensure that appropriate treatment 
Would be provided to mentally disturbed children who were adjudicated 
delinquent. The court rejected the insanity defense, since, arguably, the 
mental health of the child and his treatment needs would be considered 
at the dispositional hearing where the judge could consider a broad 
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range of alternatives. The approach, however, treats alike all accused 
children who may exhibit symptoms of a mental illness, and fails to 
recognize that mental illness alone does not provide a sufficient basis for 
an acquittal by reason of insanity. A child may be mentally ill at the time 
of the offense, but not legally insane. A distinction, therefore, should be 
made between mentally ill individuals who may be legally responsible 
for their acts, and those who are not responsible and who should not, 
therefore, suffer the consequences of an adjudication of delinquency. 
Further, the practice of considering mental illness at the time of 
disposition may not adequately address the problems associated with 
children who were legally insane at the time of the offense, but who have 
recovered or been restored to mental health by the date of their 
disposition, or those children who were legally sane on the date of the 
offense, but mentally ill and in need of psychiatric treatment at the later 
point of the disposition hearing. As to the latter group, the juvenile 
system may be beneficial depending on the quality of psychiatric 
programs available to delinquents: it provides that in lieu of incarceration 
a child may be committed to a suitable facility for psychiatric treatment. 
As to the former category, even if the child has recovered and been 
released to the community, the consequences of a delinquency 
adjudication are still formidable. 
Finally, it cannot be disputed that at the dispositional stage, most 
juvenile statutes grant a broad range of discretionary power to the judge 
in making commitment or placement decisions. There is no guarantee 
that a seriously mentally ill child will be hospitalized and receive needed 
treatment. At the most, failure to order such treatment may be 
considered a judicial "abuse of discretion" which the child could 
challenge only through formal legal proceedings brought by him at a 
later time. The practice of addressing the juvenile's mental condition 
only with regard to dispositional alternatives thus poses serious practical 
as well as legal problems. 
Conclusion 
The juvenile correctional system has generally failed in its mission of 
providing the benevolent treatment intended by the early reformers; 
moreover, the stigma of being considered a delinquent may prove 
deleterious to the juvenile. For those juveniles who endanger the 
public's safety or property, retribution may be an appropriate feature of 
the juvenile justice system. Society, however, has an interest in ensuring 
that children who are not responsible for their criminal acts are offered 
adequate treatment in an appropriate setting. It is important that those 
children, who are mentally incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness 
of their acts or conforming their behavior to the dictates of the law, be 
provided clinical intervention at the earliest possible opportunity. 
Absent an adequate program of treatment, the result may be that a 
mentally ill child will not be given a chance for effective rehabilitation 
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and that, at the termination of his commitment, he will be incapable of 
taking his proper place in society. 
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